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THE UNITED NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND THE RHODE-
SIAN INDEPENDENCE CRISIS. By Jericho Nkala. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 1985. Pp. vii, 288. $49. 
I don't believe in black majority rule ever in Rhodesia - not in a 
thousand years. 1 
On November 11, 1965, Ian Smith's white minority Government 
of Rhodesia proclaimed a unilateral declaration of independence 
(UDI) from the United Kingdom (p. 1). This resulted in a series of 
United Nations Security Council resolutions calling for economic 
sanctions against Britain's rebellious colony. Notwithstanding Mr. 
Smith's thousand-year prediction,2 after fourteen years of interna-
tional ostracism and internal unrest, Rhodesia fell and Zimbabwe, a 
majority rule state, was born. 3 
The United Nations, International Law, and the Rhodesian Inde-
pendence Crisis by Jericho Nkala4 sets an ambitious agenda for review-
ing a multitude oflegal issues raised by the UDI. Dr. Nkala addresses 
the United Nations Security Council's "non-military enforcement ac-
tion" (i.e., economic sanctions) under Chapter VII of the United Na-
1. P. 219 (quoting Mr. Ian Smith, Prime Minister of white minority Rhodesia, Sunday Times 
(London), Mar. 21, 1976). 
2. See note 1 supra and accompanying text. 
3. On December 21, 1979, Rhodesia and Britain signed the Lancaster House Agreement in 
London, England. The Agreement "[set] up a machinery for transferring political power in Rho-
desia genuinely to the African majority." P. 187. See also S.C. Res. 460, 34 U.N. SCOR, Res. & 
Dees. 15-16, U.N. Doc. S/RES/460 (1979) (noting the Lancaster House Agreement as the basis 
for terminating economic sanctions against Rhodesia). 
4. Jericho Nkala is Lecturer in Law at the University of Zimbabwe. Dr. Nkala was born in 
Southern Rhodesia. He holds an LL.B. from the University of Leeds, and received a Ph.D. from 
the University of Keele in 1978. This book is based on his doctoral thesis. 
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tions Charter5 and related international law questions such as the 
legality of the UDI. Furthermore, he draws conclusions as to the fu-
ture use and effectiveness of United Nations economic sanctions. Dr. 
Nkala's review of Rhodesia's recent history is timely in light of its 
potential application to, and implications for, the continuing problems 
of South Africa's apartheid system. 
The book consists of fourteen chapters and an appendix. The first 
four chapters provide basic background material. Dr. Nkala traces 
Rhodesia's colonial history under Great Britain. The reader learns 
that Rhodesia's white minority system was established early; "[f]rom 
1923 the history of Rhodesia is dominated by the way in which the 
white settlers of that territory consolidated their power and ensured 
that the African majority ... remained ... subservient to the interests 
of the white minority" (p. 3). Nkala also provides a helpful primer on 
the complex history of the black African majority political parties. 6 In 
addition, the early chapters discuss United Nations resolutions on 
Rhodesia prior to the UDI, the UDI's alleged illegality, and the lack 
of international recognition of white minority Rhodesia as an in-
dependent state. 
The remaining chapters discuss the imposition of sanctions by the 
United Nations Security Council, the Council's sources of power for 
taking such action, and the effectiveness of the sanctions. After re-
viewing the termination of sanctions following the Lancaster House 
Agreement, Nkala attempts to draw some conclusions as to the future 
of United Nations nonmilitary enforcement measures. 
Several chapters are devoted to what could be called "textbook" 
material. Material in some of these chapters would be more appropri-
ate for a textbook than for a discussion specifically related to the 
Rhodesian independence crisis. For instance, Chapter Seven reviews 
the effects of United Nations resolutions on nonmember states. Dr. 
Nkala notes that "[t]he members [of the United Nations] would cer-
tainly not want to see their organization fail simply because its efforts 
were torpedoed by non-members" (p. 115). The author overstates his 
case, considering that virtually every state is a United Nations mem-
ber. 7 As he points out in Chapter Fourteen, the actions of the United 
5. U.N. CHARTER arts. 39-51 ("Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the 
Peace, and Acts of Agression"). 
6. Nkala discusses, for example, the formation of the African National Congress (ANC) in 
1957 and its subsequent banning in 1959 (p. 5), the National Democratic Party's (NDP) 1960 
formation (p. S) and its 1961 banning (p. 8), and ultimately the existing Zimbabwean African 
People's Union (ZAPU), the Zimbabwe African National Council (ZANU), and the African 
National Council (ANC) (pp. 8-9). 
7. Dr. Nkala points to Switzerland and West Germany (which later joined the United Na-
tions) as nonmember states having no obligation to enforce the United Nations sanctions. P. 127. 
However, both of those states did comply. Enforcement problems were in fact much greater with 
regard to United Nations members such as Portugal, South Africa, and the U.S. See note 8 infra 
and accompanying text. 
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Nations members who contravened the economic sanctions caused far 
more problems. 8 
Other chapters provide additional examples of "textbook" mate-
i-ial. Chapter Nine discusses at length the military option for eliminat-
ing the Rhodesian rebellion, even though military force was never 
seriously considered by the Security Council. Chapter Ten expounds 
on the Security Council's voting procedure. The procedure, a straight-
forward application of Article 27 of the United Nations Charter, was 
not an issue in the Rhodesian crisis. A possible explanation for the 
extensive amount of theoretical discussion not directly related to the 
Rhodesian crisis is the book's genesis as a dissertation, where discus-
sion and definition of terms are requisite.9 
An in-depth review of Dr. Nkala's fifth chapter is worthwhile. 
This chapter contains an examination of the many nonmilitary en-
forcement measures introduced through the United Nations Security 
Council. For example, Resolution 216, a nonbinding resolution 
passed in 1965, "condemned UDI and called upon all states not to 
recognize the illegal administration in Rhodesia and to refrain from 
rendering any assistance to it" (p. 78). Resolution 221, adopted in 
1966 as the first binding resolution, called for "a mandatory oil em-
bargo under Chapter VII [of the United Nations Charter]" (p. 82). It 
was followed in 1968 by the comprehensive economic sanctions of 
Resolution 253 (p. 85). Chapter Five is the best chapter in the book 
for two reasons: first, it provides a clear, concise account of the Secur-
ity Council's actions; second, it demonstrates that the weakness of the 
Council's actions account "for the enormous number of resolutions" it 
passed (p. 90). 
One of the reasons for the large number of resolutions was that not 
all members of the Security Council perceived the Rhodesian problem 
in the same way. Britain suggested bilateral negotiations as a solution 
to the Rhodesian problem. Thus, "she saw the Security Council's ac-
tion as a means necessary to create an atmosphere in which meaning-
ful negotiations between the British Government and the Smith 
regime could take place" (p. 79). Britain "insisted on the enforcement 
measures being introduced on a piecemeal fashion" (p. 79). In con-
trast, "[t]he African members of the Security Council ... believed that 
the Smith regime should be forced into submission since by seizing 
power illegally it had forfeited its right as a party whose views should 
be taken into account" (p. 80). Britain's failure to resolve the problem 
8. South Africa and Portugal "overtly adopted policies of non-compliance." P. 232. In addi-
tion, the U.S. "openly violated those obligations" by ordering chrome from Rhodesia. P. 232. 
See also p. 89. For an excellent discussion of the United States' importation of chrome from 
Rhodesia, see Note, The Rhodesian Chrome Statute: The Congressional Response to United Na-
tions Economic Sanctions Against Southern Rhodesia, 58 VA. L. REV. 511 (1972). 
9. See, e.g., D. MADSEN, SUCCESSFUL DISSERTATIONS AND THESES (1983). 
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bilaterally eventually led to a broader consensus to impose mandatory 
measures, including Resolutions 221 and 253 noted above. 
In addition to describing the United Nations resolutions, Dr. 
Nkala discusses some of the reasons for their ineffectiveness. A major 
impediment was "the non-observance of the selected economic mea-
sures" (p. 88) by certain member states. For example, "South Africa 
and Portugal overtly declared at the outset that they were not pre-
pared to observe the decisions of the Security Council" (p. 88). Portu-
gal's participation in the sanctions was important because, until 1974, 
Mozambique was a Portuguese colony. These two "backdoors" ac-
counted for part of Rhodesia's success in weathering the economic 
sanctions for the first ten years. 
The United States also violated binding United Nations economic 
sanctions through an amendment to the Military Procurement Act of 
1971.10 This act barred the President "from prohibiting the import of 
Rhodesian chrome ... into the United States" (p. 89). A law review 
note discussing the statute states that "[t]he ostensible purpose of the 
statute was to compel the President to violate United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 253."11 In 1972, the United States "imported 
nearly three times as much chrome from Rhodesia as it did in 1965" 
(p. 89). 
Nkala tells us that ultimately it was not the United Nations sanc-
tions which brought down the Smith regime. These sanctions were 
weakened by the United States, South Africa and Portugal. The re-
gime "only ended as the result of the development of the guerrilla 
war" (p. 239). Regrettably, the reader is told little else about Rhode-
sia's internal unrest, which apparently played a major role in bringing 
down the white minority government. In light of the relative ineffec-
tiveness of economic sanctions against Rhodesia, the future of United 
Nations sanctions becomes a particularly interesting question. 
Dr. Nkala addresses this question in the final chapter, deriving sev-
eral principles from the lessons of Rhodesia. First, any sanctions must 
be imposed "quickly and effectively so as to prevent the subject of the 
action [from] adapting its economy to neutralize the effects of those 
measures. This means that the measures should be both mandatory 
and comprehensive" (p. 228). The "slow graduation of enforcement 
measures deprived the measures of their sting and allowed the Rhode-
sian economy to adapt" (p. 228). Second, there must be "universality 
of ... application" (p. 231). Dr. Nkala reiterates that Switzerland and 
West Germany were not United Nations members, 12 and that some 
members such as South Africa, Portugal, and the United States did 
10. Pub. L. No. 92-156, 85 Stat. 423 (1971). 
11. See Note, supra note 8, at 512. 
12. In this case, both countries did comply with the measures, even though they were not 
UN members. See note 7 supra and accompanying text. 
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not comply with the sanctions.13 Third, there must be "effective ma-
chinery for monitoring . . . implementation" (p. 232). Nkala points 
out that the Security Council Sanctions Committee had no indepen-
dent method of verifying the accuracy of information provided to it, 
and that it lacked the power to stop ships suspected of violating the 
embargo. 
While all three of Dr. Nkala's points are valid, they will not neces-
sarily guarantee that future sanctions will be effective. His second and 
third points are variations on the theme that sanctions will be ineffec-
tive without compliance and that compliance cannot be enforced with-
out giving enforcement power to a central body. This is not a new 
problem. As one authority pointed out more than twenty years ago, 
international law sanctions "are not systematic or centrally directed, 
and ... accordingly they are precarious in their operation."14 None of 
the United Nations members seem willing to give up any of their sov-
ereign powers to a central enforcement body, which is the only true 
way to obtain compliance. 
After pointing out the weaknesses of sanctions, Rhodesia's four-
teen year defiance of those sanctions, and the significant role of the 
guerrilla war in ending the white minority government, Dr. Nkala 
submits that such factors "should not detract from the usefulness of 
the United Nations enforcement action in other cases" and that "the 
economic weapon is merely one of a range of measures" (p. 239). His 
most persuasive argument is that "there is at present nothing better 
than [United Nations sanctions]" (p. 223). Such sanctions are "the 
only major weapon the international community has which can com-
mand the widest possible international consensus" (p. 237). Thus, 
Nkala's final message is that United Nations sanctions may not be the 
most effective method, but they're all we have. 
Although Dr. Nkala seems to believe that future sanctions could 
be successful, he is skeptical about the possibility of applying sanctions 
to South Africa. He argues that "the Western powers are not too keen 
to uphold the efficacy of the non-military enforcement action of the 
United Nations in case there should be demand for it to be used 
against ... South Africa" (p. 223). Unfortunately, Nkala does not 
elaborate on this statement, nor does he provide any support for it. 
Nkala's analysis leaves the future application of economic sanc-
tions at an abstract level. He does not attempt to use the Rhodesian 
experience as a guide to applying sanctions against South Africa. 15 
The book, however, touches on many of the parallels between Rhode-
13. See notes 7-8 supra and accompanying text. 
14. J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 101 (6th ed. 1963). 
15. A recent newspaper article does compare the Rhodesian sanctions to their possible impli-
cations for South Africa. Based on differences in four broad areas - economic, political, impor-
tance in world markets, and internal unrest - it concludes that "Rhodesia is unlikely to prove a 
reliable model for forecasting how sanctions might affect South Africa." Hawkins, Rhodesia's 
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sia and South Africa. For example, the first chapter discusses the late 
nineteenth-century legislation establishing minority rule in Rhodesia. 
It "contained all the pass laws, labour control measures, urban con-
trols and land legislation" (p. 3). Again, similar to South Africa's 
homelands policy, "[l]and was divided between African reserves, 
which were generally poor in fertility and had lower rainfall, and 
white-controlled land with the best agricultural potential" (p. 4). Just 
as South Africa presents a threat to many of its neighbors, "[t]he 
[Smith] regime became brutally aggressive against the neighbouring 
states of Botswana, Mozambique, and Zambia" (p. 218). 
Overall, The United Nations, International Law, and the Rhodesian 
Independence Crisis provides a useful reference for many of the legal 
issues surrounding Rhodesia's path from white minority rule to major-
ity rule. The reader is provided with a basic understanding of Rhode-
sia's colonial history, its internal political structure, and the 
international community's attempts to quell the white minority's uni-
lateral declaration of independence through United Nations sanctions. 
While Dr. Nkala does not thoroughly extend his analysis to the possi-
ble application of sanctions to South Africa, he has established a foun-
dation enabling the reader to draw some tentative conclusions of her 
own. 
The book's primary shortcoming is its attempt to cover too much 
ground without focusing on any particular theme. Every subject is 
treated as if it were equally important. Thus, areas which could bene-
fit from additional development are slighted in order to include areas 
better left to a textbook dis.cussion. For example, analysis of potential 
future application of United Nations sanctions to South Africa could 
be expanded while the chapters on United Nations voting procedures 
and the military option could be merely mentioned as background. 
Nevertheless, this book reminds us that the struggle for majority rule 
in Rhodesia was a success. While the United Nations sanctions may 
not have been the primary factor, they provided at least some impetus 
toward this ultimate achievement. 
- Gary A. MacDonald 
Sanctions Experience: Poor Guide far South Africa?, Christian Sci. Monitor, Oct. 20, 1986, at 10, 
col. I. 
